



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

matter of what caste, to preach the new gospel of brotherly love and human sufficiency. The fall of Buddhism is not less instructive. The later church forgot the teacher's teaching. Gorgeous rites became the sign of religion; metaphysics took the place of morality; the founder of the faith himself became God in human form; and Buddhism became a mere superstition, long moribund and at last extinct in India, living only in the meretricious garb of superstition in foreign lands. There is enough here to make Buddhism valuable as a study even to-day.

E. W. HOPKINS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1894-95. *First Series.* By Alexander Campbell Fraser, LL.D., Hon. D.C.L. Oxford, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1895. Pp. 303.

It may seem almost impertinent to say of Professor Campbell Fraser that, in this work, he speaks out of the abundance of his knowledge as well as out of the fulness of his heart. For, as all know, there is no living authority better equipped than he for the task of viewing the problems of the present in the light of the past; and there is certainly none who brings to that task a more earnest devotion to truth or a greater measure of philosophic moderation. But, while it may seem needless to speak of Professor Fraser in this way, the fact thus expressed adds a peculiar interest to this, his latest work; for, instead of giving his great subject a historical treatment, he deliberately aims at dealing with what he justly calls "the supreme human question—Are religious beliefs, or any of them, true?" This is a question which the instructed mind that has mastered many systems and sympathized with every philosophic mood too often shrinks from facing. Abundance of knowledge seems to destroy, only too frequently, that intellectual nerve which is necessary for decision. There is, therefore a peculiar interest attaching to the deliberate and positive conclusions of a mind which for half a century has been following the course of modern thought and pondering the wisdom of the ages.

Professor Fraser approaches his subject by what seems to the English reader the most natural way, that indicated by the profes-

sedly common-sense philosophy of Locke. The whole course of this first series of lectures is "arranged throughout with reference to these postulated existences," the individual Ego, the outward world, and God; and Locke's account of "the philosophical foundation of certainty" as to these three existences is taken as the point of departure, because Locke gives expression "to the uncriticised convictions of the common mind, and at a time when natural science and theological ideas were unmodified either by the scientific conception of universal physical evolution, or by the criticism of Kant and the dialectic of Hegel."

Having gone over, in a brief though interesting and characteristic way, the well-trodden path of the innumerable enigmas and perplexities which underlie these common beliefs, Professor Fraser considers successively the theories which seek an ultimate explanation by endeavoring to resolve two of the three into the third. In this way the theories of universal Materialism, Panegoism, and Pantheism receive suggestive treatment. All these are shown to be unsatisfactory. Materialism and Panegoism are self-destructive. Pantheism is shown to be inadequate because inconsistent with those "inevitable pre-suppositions of human action, necessary implicates of all moral experience which make us refuse to call evil good, or to see deity in disorder, virtue in crime, and truth in error." "I even say truth in error," adds Professor Fraser, with special reference to Spinoza, "for if human experiences, under the disparaging name of 'imagination' are themselves modes of perfect being, how can *they* be condemned as illusions, or how can there be any error if all is divine?" Thus, it is argued, each of these three theories "leads logically into universal scepticism." "A point of interrogation becomes the symbol of human life, in relation to itself and to the outside world and to God." And thus arises the necessity to consider that mental attitude—rather than philosophy—which our author prefers to call Universal Nescience. Starting from Professor Huxley's account of the origin of the popular term Agnosticism, and having examined into the validity of the connection which modern Agnosticism claims with Kant and Hume, Professor Fraser proceeds to show that the Agnostic method must be pushed to the very end, as Hume pushed it, and there be found self-destructive.

The last two chapters contain the more constructive and positive portion of the argument. Professor Fraser finds "the signal example of the divine in the spiritual being of man," that is, in man

as a conscious and self-determining agent. From this point of view, man is "supernatural." And here is to be found the best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe. For, as it is excellently put, "whether conscious perception by man is a transitory or a permanent fact in the universe, matter, apart from all perception of it, is an empty, unactual abstraction. Conscious life is the light of the world." But it is not to be supposed that man's consciousness provides a principle capable of giving a perfect solution. "The human finality is not offered as the conception of God taken from the divine centre—only as the conception of God necessarily taken at a human stand-point away from the centre. It is only offered as the best conception possible at the intermediate position." "It may be that which, when held intelligently by man, alone puts *him* in absolute rational harmony with the universe, and its acceptance then becomes the condition of success in the endeavor to live according to the deepest and truest *human* relation to what is real."

It is interesting to note that this conception is far nearer to the traditional Christian conception than to the Deism which makes the Divine unity—the ultimate unity of the universe—to be the unity of a single Person. But how much nearer, it is scarcely possible to say; for, in this First Series, Professor Fraser confesses he has "hardly passed the threshold."

CHARLES F. D'ARCY.

BALLYMENNA, IRELAND.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By W. H. Fairbrother, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy at Lincoln College, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co., 36 Essex Street, Strand, 1896.

This is a modest, careful, and useful little book. No one will find it in any way a substitute for the philosophic teaching of which it aims at being a "simple, plain exposition," but no one could desire less than Mr. Fairbrother that it should be used as such a substitute.

"It is solely," he says, "in the belief that a short, straightforward account of Green's method of working, with the results thereby arrived at, may indirectly help to promote the study of his writings, that these few pages have been written."

The substance of the book "was originally given in the form of lectures to students of philosophy at Oxford," and, although the